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Abstract
Background: The cognitive human error analysis technique is one of the second-generation techniques used to evaluate human
reliability; it has a strong, detailed theoretical background that focuses on the important cognitive features of human behavior.
Objectives: The aim of this study was to assign task and jobs crisis using analysis of cognitive human error with CREAM. Finally,
based on the results, the major causes of error were detected.
Methods: This cross-sectional study was conducted on 53 people working in an olefin unit. It is one of the most important control
rooms located in a special economic zone in Assaluyeh petrochemical industry. In this study, first a job analysis was conducted
and the sub-tasks and conditions affecting the performance of the staff were determined. Then, the control mode coefficient and
control mode type, as well as the possibility of total error were determined. Finally, the cognitive functions and type of cognitive
error related to each sub-task were identified.
Results: Among the six evaluated occupational tasks, the tasks performed by board-man and site-man had the highest values of total
human error in terms of transitory overall error coefficient (0.056 and 0.031, respectively). In addition, the following results were
obtained on the basis of the extended CREAM: execution failure (31.72%), interpretation failure (29.20%), planning failure (14.63%),
and observation failure (24.39%).
Conclusions: Common Performance Conditions (CPCs), empowerment, and the time available for work were among the most im-
portant factors that reduced occupational performance. To optimize a communication system, it is necessary to arrange the priority
of tasks, hold joint meetings, inform the staff about the termination of work permits, hold training sessions, and measure the pol-
lutants.
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1. Background
The increasing development of the industry has led to
the increased competition to produce more. To this end,
manufacturers set goals to increase the production and re-
move barriers and limitations. One of the causes of indus-
trial accidents is human error, which accounts for about
60% to 90% of all accidents (1). Therefore, human errors
are considered as a major cause of fatal accidents, injuries,
and damages. Garrison conducted a study in 1989 to review
100 major losses due to accidents in the hydro-carbide in-
dustry during a period of 30 years; the results indicated
that human error played a major role in accidents reported
in the chemical industry from 1984 to 1989. The results
of some studies also show that human errors account for
about 563 million dollars of damages to the industry. A
new analysis, reported by the same reference, shows that
during 1985 to 1990 there was about 2 billion loss due to
human error (2, 3). Obviously, human error, as small as
it can be, in many industrial environments can lead to a
catastrophic event (4). Texaco Refinery explosion and fire
in 1994, that killed 26 people and caused losses of about
48 million pounds, is an example of such accidents caused
by human error. In that accident, the control room op-
erator should have recognized 275 warnings and alarms,
became aware of them, and took the necessary measures
just within 11 minutes before the explosion (5). One of the
common features of large process systems, such as oil and
petrochemical companies, is that huge quantities of po-
tentially dangerous substances are hoarded in a central-
ized unit and are controlled by various users (6). Human
and financial burden of accidents in such units are not
only imposed on the industry itself, but it can affect the
economic situation of the country and even adjacent coun-
tries (7). Taking into account the above-mentioned facts,
the critical task of process control is continuously carried
out by the operators and control room staff; as a result,
there is a dire need to pay special attention to human er-
rors in such settings. In the process of assessment of hu-
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man error, it is necessary to consider and detect operator
error or potential human error, causal factors, and alter-
native strategies to solve such problems (8). Human error
is known as a noble factor and key element in the control
room of petrochemical industries. In the context of hu-
man error, measures such as investigating different meth-
ods of assessment, developing of new methods of analysis,
trying to check more errors, and creating more detailed
understanding of predisposing factors will be appropriate
and effective in the reduction of human errors (9). Cog-
nitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) was
first introduced by Erik Hollnagelin 1998 (10). This tech-
nique is one of the second-generation techniques for Hu-
man Reliability Analysis (HRA); it has a strong, detailed
theoretical background and focuses on the areas of cogni-
tive features of human behavior. Among the most impor-
tant advantages of this technique than other techniques of
human error analysis, we can enumerate the followings:
this method has a systematic structure for quantification
of both prospective errors (anticipating human error) and
retrospective errors (analyzing past events); it has a classi-
fication scheme; it is a model of cognition contextual con-
trol; it can define human errors on the basis of factors re-
lated to human, technology, and organization; hence, it is
a man-technology-organization (MTO) model (11, 12). It is
assumed that the most important clue to estimate human
performance or human failure probability is the degree
of control that human operators have over the situation
(13). As a result, given the important role of human error
in work system, it seems necessary to identify and evaluate
human errors and adopt the necessary control measures in
all operational systems – especially in critical systems like
control rooms, so that to reduce the rate of accidents and
reduce their related burden, which in turn can increase the
efficiency and productivity of the industry and promote
job satisfaction of staff (14).
2. Objectives
The current study aimed to identify and analyze hu-
man errors using a cognitive ergonomics approach by
means of CREAM in one of the control rooms in petrochem-
ical industry, so that to propose control measures to pre-
vent and reduce human errors.
3. Methods
This cross-sectional study was conducted in one of the
control rooms located in a special economic zone in As-
saluyeh petrochemical industry in 2015. After initial inves-
tigations, based on interviews with health and safety ex-
perts and our observations, we selected Olefin unit control
room among four possible sites, as the process in this unit
has a great deal of sensitivity and complexity (Olefin, as the
largest petrochemical product in Iran and also one of the
largest in the world, benefiting state of the art and envi-
ronmentally friendly technologies with flexible furnaces
to use both liquid and gas feed). Our selection was also
based on the workload assigned to control room operators
and staff and the tasks/sub-tasks performed by employees.
A total of 53 people were working in the olefin unit. Af-
ter the primary visits and interviews, to analyze human er-
rors using CREAM, we selected the tasks performed by con-
trol room deputy, supervisor of hot unit, supervisor of cold
unit, supervisor of shift work, operator of control room,
board-man, and site-man as these tasks were more chal-
lenging and complex. To use and implement this method
in this study, we carried out the following steps:
The first step: analysis of job tasks via hierarchical task
analysis (HTA): First, all executive tasks performed by the
staff were analyzed using HTA method. Accordingly, each
of the tasks was first identified via interviews and classified
into sub-tasks.
The second step: evaluation of common performance
conditions (CPCs) affecting user performance: In this step,
after the analysis of job tasks, the general characteristics
and common performance conditions affecting the opera-
tor were identified, which are presented in Table 1 (15).
In Table 1, all of the factors that improved, decreased,
or had no role (Not being significant) in the performance
were specified and detailed scores for each task were calcu-
lated. Every above-mentioned factor affected the probabil-
ity of human error.
The third step: determining the cognitive failure prob-
ability total (CFPt): At this step, all of the activities that re-
duced the performance were subtracted from all activities
that improved performance; the obtained value was con-
sidered as the coefficient of control mode (β), which was
obtained from Equation 1.
(1)β =
∑
R−
∑
I
R: Total activities that decrease performance; I: Total ac-
tivities that improve performance.
Using the values obtained from Equation No. No. 1 (Im-
proved and reduced values) and in accordance with Figure
1, we identified the control modes of operators as described
below.
Scrambled control: The choice of the forthcoming ac-
tion is unpredictable or haphazard. This indicates that the
operator has the least control over the system.
Opportunistic control: The next action is selected with-
out considering the identified characteristics and condi-
tion; it might be due to operator’s lack of available time,
experience, etc.
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Table 1. Relationship Between the Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) and the
Level of Performance Reliability
(CPC) CPC
Level/Description
Effects
Adequacy of
organization
Very efficient -0.6 Improved
Efficient 0 Not significant
Inefficient 0.6 Reduced
Deficient 1
Working conditions
Advantageous -0.6 Improved
Compatible 0 Not significant
Incompatible 1 Reduced
Adequacy of MMI and
operational Support
Supportive -1.2 Improved
Adequate -0.4 Not significant
Tolerable 0 Not significant
Inappropriate 1.4 Reduced
Availability of
procedures/plans
Appropriate -1.2 Improved
Acceptable
Inappropriate
0 Not significant
Appropriate Improved 1.4 Reduced
Number of
simultaneous Goals
Fewer than capacity 0 Not significant
Matching current
capacity
0 Not significant
More than capacity 1.2 Reduced
Available time
Adequate -1.4 Improved
Temporarily
inadequate
1 Not significant
Continuously
inadequate
2.4 Reduced
Time of day
Day time (adjusted) 0 Not significant
Night time
(unadjusted)
0.6 Reduced
Adequacy of training
and Experience
Adequate, high
experience
-1.4 Improved
Adequate, limited
experience
0 Not significant
Inadequate 1.8 Reduced
Crew collaboration
quality
Very efficient -1.4 Improved
Efficient 0 Not significant
Inefficient 0.4 Not significant
Deficient 1.4 Reduced
Tactical control: Operator’s performance more or less
follows planned procedures while some later deviations
are still possible.
Strategic control: Because of the availability of suffi-
cient time, the operator is able to control action at higher
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Figure 1. Determining the Control Modes on the Basis of Control Mode Coefficient
(β)
levels so that the operator can more efficiently select and
take other control measures.
Using the obtained β value, and based on Equation
2, the cognitive failure probability total (CFPt) was calcu-
lated.
(2)CFPt = 0.0056× 100.25β
The fourth step: Error analysis Using extended CREAM
and quantification of Cognitive failure probability (CFPi):
In this step, after breaking down the tasks into sub-tasks,
cognitive functions and type of cognitive errors were de-
termined as shown in Table 2. In this cognitive cognitive
functions are categorized into four classes of observation,
interpretation, planning, and execution errors. Based on
the type of identified error, each of the identified sub-tasks
was placed in one of the sub-classes (types of cognitive er-
rors).
Taking into account the scores obtained from the sec-
ond step (total CPCs scores) and the fourth step (CFPo
scores) and using the following equation, cognitive failure
probability for each of the sub-tasks was calculated as fol-
lows (10):
(3)CFPi = CFP × 100.25ρII
(4)PII =
∑9
i=1
Pi
PII: The parameter defined in Equation 3 represents the
total CPCs or Pi scores obtained in Table 1.
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Table 2. Cognitive Failure Probability Associated With Cognitive Functions
Cognitive Function Generic Failure Type Basic Value
Observation
O1. Wrong object observed 0.001
O2. Wrong identification 0.007
O3. Observation not made 0.007
Interpretation
I1. Faulty diagnosis 0.02
I2. Decision error 0.01
I3. Delayed interpretation 0.01
Planning
P1.Priority error 0.01
P2.Inadequate plan 0.01
Execution
E1. Action of wrong type 0.003
E2. Action at wrong time 0.003
E3. Action on wrong object 0.0005
E4. Action out of sequence 0.003
E5. Missed action 0.003
4. Results
Based on the results of the present study, the highest
levels of Cognitive Failure Probability total (CFPt) were ob-
served in the tasks of control room operator – board-man,
site-man, supervisor of the cold unit, supervisor of the hot
unit, deputy head of the control room, and supervisor of
the shift, which were 0.056, 0.031, 0.0099, 0.0099, 0.0056,
and 0.0031, respectively. The score of control mode coeffi-
cient (β), scores of common performance conditions (pi),
total scores of pi (PII), scores of each of cognitive errors
in each sub-task (CFPo), and Cognitive Failure Probability
(CFPi) were calculated via CREAM and the results are pre-
sented in Table 3.
According to Table 3, the highest levels of cognitive fail-
ure probability total (CFPt) were observed in the tasks per-
formed by board-man and site-man, which were equal to
0.056 and 0.031, respectively; they had opportunistic con-
trol mode. The control modes of the tasks performed by
the supervisor of the cold unit, the supervisor of the hot
unit, and the supervisor of shift were of tactical control
mode.
Based on the results of Figure 2, among all the identi-
fied tasks of six analyzed jobs, the cognitive function of Ex-
ecution had a Cognitive Failure Probability total of 31.72%,
which compared to other cognitive functions, it gave the
highest value.
5. Discussion
Based on the results, the highest levels of cognitive
failure probability total (CFPt) were observed in the tasks
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Figure 2. Percentage of Cognitive Functions in the Sub-Tasks of the Studied Jobs
performed by board-man and site-man. The highest level
of cognitive failure probability total (CFPt) in board-man’s
tasks was observed in the control mode coefficient, β,
which was due to four activities that reduced the perfor-
mance without any improvement in the common perfor-
mance conditions. Among the effective conditions and fac-
tors that reduced the performance, we can note the follow-
ings: empowerment, the relevance of human-machine sys-
tems, the time available for work, and the quality of avail-
able trainings. Mohammadfam et al. conducted a study
in 2015 and compared the two approaches of CREAM and
standardized plant analysis risk human reliability analy-
sis (SPAR-H) to examine human errors; it was found that
CREAM is a reliable method to identify and analyze human
error caused by the nurses (16). The control mode coeffi-
cient for the site-man’s task was 3, which indicated that
one activity improving the performance is subtracted from
the four activities reducing performance. Among the effec-
tive conditions and factors reducing the performance of
site-man, we can suggest the followings: empowerment,
working conditions, performing two or more tasks simul-
taneously, and the time available for work. Concerning the
factors improving the conditions, we can point out to the
availability of procedures and plans. A comparison of the
tasks of the board-men and those of the site-men showed
that the two factors of empowerment and the time avail-
able for work were the common causes of reduced perfor-
mance in both the tasks. In a study by Greger et al. in
1999, the authors used CREAM to analyze the causes of train
crashes among the cities of Sweden; the results obtained
for four tasks showed that three factors of "performing two
or more tasks simultaneously", "time available for work",
and "quality of available trainings and work experience"
were associated with reduced performance reliability (17).
According to the results obtained from Figure 2, the high-
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est level of cognitive failure related to cognitive function
(31.72%); this type of cognitive failure had the highest per-
centage of error among the site-man tasks. In addition, Ma-
zlomi et al. conducted a study in 2011 using cognitive er-
gonomics approach to evaluate human error in a control
room in petrochemical industry; according to the results,
the performance error had the highest level (51.70%) (18).
Among the sub-tasks of site-men, the cognitive failure of
"defects in the Execution" had the highest level of cogni-
tive failure probability (0.05). Concerning the other sub-
tasks of site-men, including receiving permit, exchanging
information, checking a site, and registering the reports,
the cognitive failure probability was 0.03. The highest level
of cognitive failure probability in the sub-tasks of board-
men related to observation errors, which was equal to 0.22.
The observed level of cognitive failure related to the sub-
tasks of information exchange with previous shifts, which
among cognitive failures, they were sub-classes of non-
observation and incorrect detection, in sequence. In ad-
dition, concerning the sub-tasks of board-men, the high-
est value of cognitive failure probability (0.316) was ob-
tained for the cognitive functions of planning and inter-
pretations. Mirto et al. conducted a study in 2006 in or-
der to quantify the errors in the maintenance tasks of con-
trol room operators in the chemical industry using fuzzy
classification systems based on CREAM; the results showed
that most cognitive activities related to connection, im-
plementation, monitoring, diagnosis, planning, coordi-
nation, evaluation, verification and authentication, scan-
ning, and recording, in sequence (19). Given the results of
various studies, errors are associated with human factors
and ergonomics science and technology (human-machine
interaction) (20). Therefore, the review and evaluation of
errors have an important role in the identification and re-
duction of common performance conditions and errors
in staff operations; consequently, it can reduce human in-
juries and also damages to equipment, properties, and the
environment. Limitations of the study included a cross-
sectional nature and ignoring other methods of data col-
lection but questionnaire and interview. Among different
methods of human reliability analysis (HRA), CREAM takes
a new cognitive ergonomics approach and takes human re-
liability into account; hence, it plays an important role in
the prevention of accidents and the related outcomes.
5.1. Conclusions
The results of the present study suggest that the tasks
of the board-man had the highest level of cognitive failure
probability, while the tasks of the supervisor of the shift
had the lowest level of cognitive error. Among the tasks
of the board-men, the cognitive function of observation
and among the tasks of the supervisor of the hot unit, the
cognitive function of interpretation had the highest levels
of cognitive failure probability. The results indicate that,
concerning the tasks of staff at higher levels of organiza-
tional structure, for instance at managerial levels, there are
less cognitive administrative functions and higher levels
of cognitive failure probability in interpretation and plan-
ning. As a result, according to the findings of this study,
control mode in managerial tasks is of opportunistic type,
while in tasks requiring cognitive administrative function,
the control mode is tactical. The most important recom-
mendations to improve the existing situation and thus to
reduce the rate of human errors are as follows: optimizing
communication system, arranging the sequence of tasks,
making coordination with other colleagues during differ-
ent shifts, holding joint meetings, using practical software
to empower the personnel, and using devices to measure
contaminants and pollutants.
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Table 3. Results of Analysis of Human Error Using CREAM Based on a Cognitive Ergonomics Approach
(CPC) Description Pi Sub-Task Cognitive Function Generic Failure Type CFPi CFP.
Task: Deputy Head of the Control Room (β = 0 Tactical) (PII = -0.6)
Adequacy of organization Reduced 0.06 Check out the entire unit Observation Observation not made 0.0049 0.007
Working conditions Not significant 0 Study report Observation Wrong object observed 0.0007 0.001
Adequacy of MMI and
operational Support
Reduced 1.4 Test results Interpretation Decision error 0.007 0.01
Availability of
procedures/plans
Improved -1.2 Repair works Interpretation Faulty diagnosis 0.014 0.02
Number of simultaneous
Goals
Not significant 0 Problems staff Execution Missed action 0.0021 0.003
Available time Improved -1.4 Submit a report Interpretation Faulty diagnosis 0.014 0.02
Time of day Not significant 0
Adequacy of training and
Experience
Not significant 0
Crew collaboration
quality
Not significant 0
Task: Supervisor of the Hot Unit(β = 1 Tactical) (PII = -0.8)
Adequacy of organization Reduced 0.6 Study Report Planning Inadequate plan 0.00189 0.003
Working conditions Reduced 1 Coordination with
management
Interpretation Delayed interpretation 0.0063 0.01
Adequacy of MMI and
operational Support
Not significant -0.4 Export Permit Execution Action of wrong type 0.00189 0.003
Availability of
procedures/plans
Improved -1.2 Monitoring of doing things Observation Wrong identification 0.00441 0.007
Number of simultaneous
Goals
Reduced 1.2 Safety at Work Interpretation Decision error 0.0063 0.01
Available time Improved -1.4 Relationship with site-man Execution Action of wrong type 0.00189 0.003
Time of day Not significant 0 Check out Board-man Observation Wrong identification 0.00441 0.007
Adequacy of training and
Experience
Not significant 0 Report writing Execution Missed action 0.00189 0.003
Crew collaboration
quality
Not significant 0.4 Record permit Execution Missed action 0.00189 0.003
Task: Supervisor of the Cold Unit (β = -1 Tactical) (PII = 1.6)
Adequacy of organization Not significant 0 Exchange of information Execution Action of wrong type 0.0075 0.003
Working conditions Reduced 1 Study Report Interpretation Decision error 0.025 0.01
Adequacy of MMI and
operational Support
Not significant -0.4 Follow-up work Planning Priority error 0.025 0.01
Availability of
procedures/plans
Reduced -1.2 Access to routine work Observation Observation not made 0.0175 0.007
Number of simultaneous
Goals
Reduced 1.2 Investigate and eliminate
equipment failure
Interpretation Decision error 0.025 0.01
Available time Not significant 1 Data entry work order Observation Faulty diagnosis 0.005 0.02
Time of day Not significant 0 Record permit Planning Priority error 0.025 0.01
Adequacy of training and
Experience
Not significant 0 Association with shift work
site
Planning Inadequate plan 0.025 0.01
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Crew collaboration
quality
Not significant 0 Monitor and follow control Planning Priority error 0.025 0.01
Monitoring and follow-up
site
Interpretation Decision error 0.025 0.01
Close permit Observation Observation not made 0.025 0.007
Report writing Interpretation Faulty diagnosis 0.005 0.02
Task: Supervisor of the Shift (β = 0 Tactical) (PII = -1.8)
Adequacy of organization Not significant 0 Study report Observation Wrong identification 0.007 0.0024
Working conditions Not significant 0 Exchange of information Interpretation Faulty diagnosis 0.02 0.007
Adequacy of MMI and
operational Support
Not significant -0.4 Obtaining work permits,
repairs and issue a permit
Execution Action out of sequence 0.003 0.001
Availability of
procedures/plans
Improved -1.3 Process control and
monitoring problems
Interpretation Faulty diagnosis 0.02 0.007
Number of simultaneous
Goals
Reduced 1.2 Submit a Report and
conclusions
Execution Action of wrong type 0.003 0.001
Available time Improved -1.4
Time of day 0
Adequacy of training and
Experience
Not significant 0
Crew collaboration
quality
Not significant 0
Task: Operator Board-Man (β = 4 Opportunistic) (PII = 6.2)
Adequacy of organization Reduced 0.6 Exchange data with
previous shifts
Observation Observation not made 0.007 0.22
Working conditions Not significant 0 Study Report Observation Wrong identification 0.007 0.22
Adequacy of MMI and
operational Support
Reduced 1.4 Follow-up work Planning Priority error 0.01 0.316
Availability of
procedures/plans
Not significant 0 Control conditions Interpretation Decision error 0.01 0.316
Number of simultaneous
Goals
Not significant 0
Available time Reduced 2.4
Time of day Not significant 0
Adequacy of training and
Experience
Reduced 1.8
Crew collaboration
quality
Not significant 0
Task: Operator Site-Man (β = 3 Opportunistic) (PII = 4)
Adequacy of organization Reduced 0.6 Exchange of information Execution Action of wrong type 0.003 0.03
Working conditions Reduced 1 Get permit Execution Action out of sequence 0.003 0.03
Adequacy of MMI and
operational Support
Not significant 0 Routine work (Check the
website)
Execution Missed action 0.003 0.03
Availability of
procedures/plans
Improved 1.2 Repair works Execution Action on wrong object 0.005 0.05
Number of simultaneous
Goals
Reduced 1.2 Submit a report Execution Action on wrong object 0.003 0.03
Available time Reduced 2.4
Time of day Not significant 0
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Adequacy of training and
Experience
Not significant 0
Crew collaboration
quality
Not significant 0
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